Table 1. Antidumping activity by FTA status
Target Country | ||
Non-FTA Country | FTA Country | |
Pre-FTA | 506 | 370 |
(58%) | (42%) | |
Post-FTA | 3554 | 375 |
(90%) | (10%) | |
At nearly 2%, the US has to be the world's most litigious society. This realignment can firstly be seen in the United States advancing its claim for a seat at the East Asian Summit. Last week the US received an expression of general support from the Foreign Ministers after the Informal Consultation Meeting and Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo later indicated that ASEAN has already decided to include the US in the EAS. Hilary Clinton’s determination to return to Vietnam in October for the EAS together with Obama being scheduled to attend the next year’s EAS in Indonesia suggests that the US is confident that its accession is assured over the medium term. As a part of this process, ASEAN Ministers also welcomed the decision to include the US in the first ASEAN Defence Minister's Plus with Eight Dialogue Partners scheduled for October.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the only player to not greet increased US involvement in the region warmly was China. China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi was quoted as saying that China "took notes with open attitude" of the ASEAN proposal for an expanded EAS and "look[ed] forward for consultations" with ASEAN on subject (the Nation, July 22). But while China is dissatisfied with the direction the EAS is taking; this is a battle it already knows it has lost. As Wu Jianmin (a member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Group) observed last year, ‘We know that China could not stop the US if it really wants to join the EAS.’ Indeed, according the declaration establishing the EAS, membership is determined by ASEAN alone – and while China is influential it simply can not veto a proposal (unlike in UNSC).
Moreover, China has seen the US and ASEAN draw closer on an issues of major interest to it, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Secretary of State Clinton’s identification of this issue as a “pivot” of regional security brings the United States back as a player after more than a decade of diplomatic passivity (to China’s notable discomfort).
The emerging US-ASEAN-China realignment can also be seen in Clinton’s proposal (together with 12 other Asian nations, including the host Vietnam) for a dispute resolution mechanism to be established. Such a mechanism would build on (or over) the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed between ASEAN and the PRC. This Declaration can essentially be interpreted as a response to the 1992 ‘Law on the Territorial Waters and continuous Area‘, and reflects an agreement to shelve the issue rather than resolve it – hence the lack of a dispute resolution mechanism. ASEAN efforts to move from ‘shelving’ to ‘resolving’ this issue have been systematically thwarted by China, and so it unsurprising that China would again register dissatisfaction. China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi noting, “turning the bilateral issue into an international, or multilateral one, would only worsen the situation and add difficulties to resolving the issue.” (WSJ China rebuts Clinton). Perhaps Yang meant to add “for China.”? 
China’s 1947 Map: basis of the South China Sea Claim: fat dotted lines as limit of territory.
Lastly, this re-alignment can be seen in US-South Korea relations and posturing in the ARF over the sinking of the South Korean corvette, the Cheonan. Again China and the US found themselves in opposite corners over this issue, China reportedly working to remove references to the sinking as a North Korean attack. This disagreement over wording caused adoption of the Chairman’s statement to be delayed a day. Korea’s growing frustration with China’s role in diplomatically supporting the North has, similarly to ASEAN, caused South Korea to look to its traditional security provider, the US. This week’s war games off the Korean peninsula, while clearly focussed on the North, have caused concerns in Beijing. Yet notwithstanding the repositioning of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier the George Washington on the East side of the peninsula, the US and Korea have been willing to disregard China’s warnings. Intriguingly, Japanese officers are observing the joint U.S.-Korean exercises.
In conclusion, a realignment is underway in East Asia. Increasingly, ASEAN (and Korea) are moving closer to the geographically distant US, while China is finding itself surprising distant from its neighbours.
As you can see, the DPJ has fallen from a high of 75% support (red) to 33% and the blue line of “do not support” has gone from 17% to 56% - implying that most Japanese have gone from optimism to pessimism about this administration (see also here). That was certainly the feeling on the ground last month, but why?
The poll result supports Tobias Harris’s argument that the problem with the DPJ and its popularity is Hatoyama himself. In response to the question, “who is the most suitable as Prime Minister?”, Hatoyama name comes not first, but sixth. Indeed, even more bitterly for the DPJ, the opposition LDP Masazoe Yoichi comes first at 29%. This result gives Masazoe further ammunition in his struggle to become Leader of the Opposition against the incumbent Tanigaki. Hatayama even scored lower than his Foreign Minister Okada, Transport Minister Maehara, and Deputy Minister Kan but none exceeded 10% approval in any case.
There are various causes of this decline, but management of the Global Financial crisis seems not to be one of them. Rather domestic issues such as the corruption scandals plaguing the DPJ (focused mostly on Ozawa but Hatayama himself is also under scrutiny) are center stage. Problems relating to the relocation of the US military base at Futenma are also important, as is postal savings reform.
But overall the problem is a lack of “getting things done” – indeed 44% of Japanese cited this as the biggest problem of the Hatoyama administration. So rather than focusing on a project such as the East Asian Community which may or may not “succeed” (and how to even measure that), Hatayama’s next few months ought to focus on getting a clear success. Given his domestic situation, there are opportunities and risks for other countries wishing to cooperate with Japan, but overall Japan’s biggest contribution to East Asia will be to get its ship back in order.
Yesterday (17th) at Prince Hotel the Japan Institute for International Affairs convened a symposium on East Asian community. With the opening speech delivered by Hatoyama himself, and a promise to broadcast the entire proceedings both domestically within Japan and overseas, the event was quite high profile. I will discuss the significance of the symposium, and then reflect on some of the speeches and discussions.
Significance of the symposium:
The presenters themselves represented the cream of
And interesting side point, there was a similar symposium at Aoyama Gaku-in on Friday (12th) last week on East Asian community. This symposium was also populated with high level academics, such as Korea’s former Ambassador to the US Han Sungjun and China’s former Ambassador to France Wu Jianmin and Japan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations Taniguchi Makoto. There are simply too many high-level academics in
The nationality of the presenters at the JIIA symposium was also interesting and deliberate. First up, the representatives of Northeast Asia, Shiraishi Takashi (Japan), Gong Ro Myung (Korea), and Wang Li Zhou (China). With Hassan Wirajuda otherwise engaged, Tommy Koh (Singapore) was the only representative from Southeast Asia. Then came the ‘others’, TJ Pempel and Ezra Vogel (US), Rajiv Sikri (India) and Peter Drysdale (Australia). The consensus in the group of academics was clearly in favor of the East Asian Summit as opposed to the ASEAN+3, even Wang (China) was careful to note the value and significance of the 16 party grouping.
Hatoyama’s speech:
Hatoyama’s speech was good, but not ground breaking. That Hatoyama would chose to come (he was unable to come to the Friday meet at Aoyama) to this meeting is significant. It is a symbol that he continues to be interested in the EAc idea and is serious about promoting it. While no major policy shifts were announced, he did make clear his determination to “break open”
Panelist’s Discussions:
Shiraishi Takashi, is never bad to listen to. Shiraishi revealed that the Hatoyama administrations had recently approved of a plan to propose a regional scientific and technical community be established at the East Asia Summit. Another part of Japan’s efforts to lift the significance of the 16 party group and assert its leadership no doubt, but a valuable contribution no less. Shiraishi also identified the biggest problem of the East Asia Summit as the lack of any ‘big’ success. In contrast to the ASEAN Plus Three which will activate of the 24th the Chiang Mai Initiatives, the EAS has managed only a series of moderate, non-headline grabbing initiatives such as the ERIA. I could not agree more.
Gong Ro-myung, put together a simple presentation focusing on one issue – regional security cooperation. Or more accurately, the lack there of. Gong stated that all the initiatives in East Asia on technical issues, economic and non-traditional security (pandemics, disaster relief, piracy etc) was not spilling over into cooperation in security. He contrasted this to the European experience, and urged the regional governments to let spill over occur. This idea is interesting because it suggests that security cooperation would be a nature occurring phenomena arising from other initiatives but that regional governments are actively preventing it. I imagine he was thinking about the North Korea issue, but this point is true to an extent also in Southeast Asia.
Tommy Koh, was challenged by Funabashi Yoichi (Asahi Shimbun) about the whether the ASEAN deserves to sit in the drivers seat of regional integration. Koh noted that the ASEAN position as driver is due to default, acknowledging that ASEAN not the best driver (ie hardly ideal) for integration but the only one that all were comfortable with.
ASEAN was also challenged by Vogel, who asked Koh is ASEAN was perhaps not up to the task of managing a real crisis (I think security is what he had in mind). In defending the honor for the ASEAN, Koh responded (revealing for first time apparently) by relaying a story about cyclone Nargis and Burma. In the aftermath of the cyclone, the military Junta in Burma initially turned down offers of international food aid, causing additional unnecessary hunger, disease and suffering for its people. ASEAN members confront the Burmese foreign minister (on Buddha’s birthday as the story goes) and demanded that he call his masters and tell them that Burma’s decision not to accept aid is harming the reputation of ASEAN, and that Burma must accept international aid. Like, in the event of Tsunami, ASEAN head of states were able to call each other immediately to coordinate response and help set up an international pledging conference.
While interesting, I do not think Tommy Koh’s response actually answered the question – or answered it indirectly. Managing cyclones and tsunami, which are both natural disasters, can be considered crisis management. But I feel the question was about security, and Koh’s deft side stepping of the issue merely re-enforced the view that ASEAN was in fact not up the task.
All in all, a highly interesting symposium. Thanks go to Yuzawa Takashi for setting up and the participants.
Source: MOFA Homepage, India and China Basic Information (Japanese).According to the Weekly Economist (Japanese publication, not the UK one), Japan’s sovereign risk is now estimated to be higher than that of China. In other words, the financial world trusts China more than Japan. That has to hurt.
The insurance premium on Japanese Government bonds rose to .71% in the CDS market as opposed to China’s (.64%) in Jaruary, reflecting the perceived rise in Japan’s sovereign risk. At the same time, major credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s has reappraised Japan’s long-term government bonds down from stable to negative.
This is yet another blow to Japan’s national identity as economic leader of Asia.
The Japanese, and the rest of the world, are waiting for when, not if, China finally overtakes Japan, (as nearly happened last year). Indeed, as Shirashi Takeshi eloquently points out in January’s Chuo Koron, Japan’s politicians are less and less couching Japan’s role in the world as that of an economic leader.
With the partial exception of Koizumi’s general policy speech (Shoshin Hyomei Ensetsu – a set piece annual speech), the most recent Prime Minister’s of Japan have progressively moved from an economic identity for their nation (Keizai Taikoku). In his general policy speech, Abe studiously avoided the economy, talking about an idealized ‘beautiful’ Japan. This shift is also true of Fukuda and Aso. Hatoyama’s policy speech last year also holds to this trend, starting off by stating that Japan can contribute in more areas than the just the economy – and talking even about how Japan needs Asia (not the other way around). His speech was even titled “Japan as a bridge”, i.e. an (in-itself useless) road connecting two places which are (in themselves) important.
It is clear that the transition with China is impacting on Japan’s identity – make a good thesis topic. Eh, Kai?
In Japan, where marriage itself is an institution under threat, a new phenomenon of actors taking the place bridesmaids, best-men, friends and family in wedding ceremonies is increasing.
The demand is great enough that some companies specialize in providing actors to stand in at Wedding. One such company “Wedding Assist”, said every year sees more demand. It already has 30 actors as members of staff. Another “freelancer” took over one hundred jobs as a stand-in friend last year.
These actors are often given quite specific instructions, such details of how they met the wife (it is normally women who request actors) and what to say. In some cases, actors requested to give a speech, to bless the marriage. In one case, the company was asked to provide actor to play the parents, brothers and sisters of one woman – the whole family.
Often the actors are hired by one party (the bride) without the knowledge of the husband. One woman confessed that she had hired actors because she could not fill her quota of friends for the wedding ceremony. She felt so embarrassed that she could not tell her husband, and instead hired actors. She had changed jobs so many times that she had lost all connection to her friends. Another woman said that after she quit Uni her friends circle had collapsed.
These women had no time for a hobby, or religious service, and no social network outside of work or Uni. But in a society under economic pressure those networks are failing. A society on the edge, the isolation of Tokyo and other big cities in Japan is truly turning out some strange social phenomena.
This was inspired from the late night news story about marriage in Japan. Not normally an area I care much about, but it chimed with my experiences of Japan. The story was called “Muen Shakai”, perhaps translated best as “A Society Without Social Bonds (Friends).”
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