Japan, China and Korea: Territory versus Trade

Following on the ideas of China Bystander here, I wanted to take a look at how the territorial dispute is influencing regional cooperation in North-east Asia.

The Senkaku dispute is slowing getting out of control again, on 3 January several Japanese (local) politicians landed on a disputed island provoking official protest by Beijing. A few days later, the Japanese government saw fit to expand the powers of the Coast Guard to detain suspicious boats in the area, providing better (domestic) legal cover for a future arrest of Capt. Zhan. Again, to further bolster their position, the Government of Japan saw fit to name several small islets in disputed territory, with very boring names.

In response the Chinese side have expanded the area of their aerial maritime surveillance to include the disputed areas, with the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration stating that the twin-engine Harbin Y-12 can fly over the area.

I have already heard from the Japanese side that the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute had caused negotiations on a bilateral FTA and at the CMIM to be shelved as China refused to deal with Japan).

But on the other hand I had a sense that even if these events were being 'exploited' in bargaining positions at the official level, most Japanese people did not care. I guessed (hoped) this may be true also for the everyday Korean and Chinese too.

Fortunately some good polling has been done on this subject. A recent poll by Asahi in China, Korea and Japan found that most people still wanted a trilateral FTA to go ahead. The numbers were Japanese 52%, Korean 55% and Chinese 82% supporting a trilateral FTA. Intriguing given the posturing at the official level.

I hope that we can make a distinction between short term public outrage over a disputed territories and the very real but quite aggregate interest in just getting along in Northeast Asia.

Unfortunate event in East China Sea

Maehara Seiji pretty made his name on the back the Senkaku dispute September of last year. His name was mud in Beijing, which ironically, is an advantage of sorts. The newly appointed Matsumoto Takeaki is unlikely to has the punch to be able to take the fight to Beijing over the East China Sea issue and will be a responsive player. As much as anything, the upcoming trilateral meeting between the CJK make making a stand on the start of production (extraction of Oil) by China's state owned SNOOC in the disputed areas (Shirakaba) too difficult I suspect.

While Chief Cabinet Sect. Edano has noted with concern the development of CNOOC going into the area to start production, he is waiting before responding.

I think Maehara would have picked up the phone and starting making a fuss already.

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0309/TKY201103090225.html?ref=rss

We don't owe you anything

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Ma Zhao Xu (馬朝旭) has gone on record stating that Japan does not have any grounds to claim damages for the Senkaku/Diaoyutai island collision.

Reason: Because China asked Japan for compensation.

This response is due to the Japan Coast Guard recent delivery of a demand for compensation to the (now heroic) Capt. Zhan.

Still, Ma is tame choice for a response. At least China did not wheel on the Ultimo Ratio Regis known as Spokeswoman Jiang Yu (scary - watch her in action here).

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0213/TKY201102120264.html?ref=rss

Japan needs space, no space given

After President Medvedev's visit to the Kurils, or Northern Territories a few days ago on the back of China's protest in the East China Sea, Japanese people and policy makers got even more rattled. Not withstanding the legality or otherwise of claims (see me here), it is clear that everyone needs to calm down and stop being provocative.

In that regard, a big 'Thank You China' for sending another survey ship into disputed areas.

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1109/TKY201011090552.html?ref=rss

This is just dumb. The fact that the Chinese survey ship turned around and left once requested by the JCG shows that China is at least a little sensitive to the fact that it can ill afford another run in Japan. But if these type of events increase, another 'accident' is almost guaranteed.

More thoughts on Senkaku video

There is an awful lot in the videos are there implications. I am stilling trying to sort it all out - I will try to focus on three questions here:

1/Why did JCG initally act to repell the MinJinYu?

2/Was JCG action illegal?

3/Does Japan's act constute a challenge to the status quo?

1. JCG initially warned the MinJinYu that it was in Japanese Terrority and to retreat. If the MinJinYu were within Japan's EEZ it would be permitted to fish without a permit subject to Japanese regulation. If the MinJinYu were in Japan'ss EEZ then the JCG can board and inspect/detain etc.

But the Minjinyu was within the Joint Measure area.

The JCG's action therefore is strange as only China could act (or give permission, more*) against the Minjinyu for breach of fishery. The point is that the JCG did not ask to inspect, they asked the Minjinyu to "move along please." This is part of Japan's posture of demonstrating "effective control" over the islands.

Normally, when asked by a JCG boat with a Mk44 Bushmaster II 30mm autocannon the fishing boat leaves- because that is Sane even though it acknowledges JApan's effective control.

CAptain Zhan is however out of control - and rams the JCG boat. Now this puts the JCG in a bind. In order to continue to demostrate effective control, they have to arrest the Minjinyu for "interfering with official duties" of the JCG, i.e. public safety on the sea.

But in order to do so, the Japanese side will want China to acknowledge its effective control by giving permission to arrest the Minjinyu. The 12 hour wait before the arrest is likely due (in some part) to the Japanese side trying to get the Chinese to grant approval - only to be rebuffed. China would not acknowledge that, would not want to be seen allowing the Japanese to arrest its citizen in its (PRC's) territory. China has to say no.

Now what will Japan do? Capt. Zhan's action has tested the informal situation of Japan's effective control. The decision Japan makes here to arrest or not to arrest determines whether or not Japan really believes the Senkaku Sea area is its territory or not, as such it has formalized the informal and unspoken situation of competiting interpretations in Beijing and Tokyo - something probably neither side was happy about (China did not need another dispite after ARF).

Thus Japan decides to arrest, without China's permission, in order to maintain the situation of effective control.

in answering the above three therefore,

1/Why did JCG initally act to repell the MinJinYu? In order to maintain effective control

2/Was JCG action illegal? Not if the area is actually Japanese EEZ, but under current understandings probably yes. Although, illegal does not mean unreasonable!

3/Does Japan's act constute a challenge to the status quo? Yes. Although China's not giving permission to arrest and subsequent protest means that the status quo is unchanged by Japanese de facto challenge.

The sad thing is that this could have been handled so much better by both sides. Japan could have not arrested Zhan and detained him with permission from the Chinese by saying (privately) that although something needs to happen to Zhan, it does not consitute challenge to status quo. China knows about deterence. Japan can not simply let a boat which ramms its officials to get away. An understanding was possible here - at least with hindsight.

random thoughts over, back to work.

Dietmen view video of Senkaku collision

The Japanese Diet today saw the video taken by the coast guard of the collision. see, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1101/TKY201011010172.html

At least the first collision at 10.15am seems to be a deliberate "attack" act. The Japanese Yonakuni (1350t) is nearly 10 times the size of the Chinese fisher (166t). Damage taken by the Yonakuni is to the aft of the boat belie a Japanese "attack" on the fisherboat (Bin Pu Yu, I think).

The second collision is harder to say, as the Fishermen were clearly running home with a Japanese boat in pursuit. There is a chance that Japanese boat "Mizuki" tried to cut off the BinPuyu. Again, the marking suggest differently (drag in wrong direction) but I am not a forensic analyst. It is likely however that the Binpuyu could have either steered to avoid or simply decelerated to avoid the collision.

The 11 hours wait between stopping the boat and arresting the captain also suggest that the MOFA were involved, as initially thought. The decision potentially an act of Maehara Seiji.

The location of the collisions is also revealing, as is the site of the formal arrest. The decisions here suggest that Japan clearly thought it had authority although see, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/30/china-japan-trawler-incident-japans-unwise-and-borderline-illegal-detention-of-the-chinese-skipper/

Maehara scraps the 1978 understanding

Foreign Minister Maehara scraps the 1978 informal understanding (with Deng Xiaoping) over the Senkakus.

Ai ya~

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1021/TKY201010210259.html

Yasukuni calms situation (reverso-land post)

Event: 66 Japanese Diet-men go to the Yasukuni Shrine (19OCT2010)11am.

Argument and Significance: This is likely to inflame China nationalist passions by conflating territory and history issues in Sino-Japanese relations. This will impact on ability to reach a political conclusion to the dispute (dragging it on).

Analysis: As Anti-Japanese protest continue to rock China (esp. Sichuan province), the decision of a number of Japanese Diet-men to visit the Yasukuni Shrine today is likely be have negative effects.

The first and most important is simply that it puts unneeded pressure on the Chinese Gov't which already calling for calm.

Secondly, it undercuts Japan gov't's own message of remaining calm, both to its own citizens and to the Chinese side.

Lastly, by conflating history and territory issues, Japan is making it easier for the East China Sea to go from a failed attempt at a 'Sea of fraternity' to an outright 'Sea of Hostility.' The Sea of Hostility is most likely to be of an unofficial nature initially, but no doubt Chinese nationalists and Japanese nationalist will be getting in their boats soon. While China has been preventing such boats from launching thus far, the CCP's ability to continue doing so is uncertain.

Senkaku flare up prospects: China pressures Google?

While the Senkaku issue has mostly blown over, the possibility for it to flare up is marked.

Firstly, today the Diet Budget committee agreed to view the footage of the actual collision - although no decision is yet made on whether to release it. I imagine it will be released however, in time and one way or another. The timing of that decision counts, too early and flare up is possible.

Secondly, Japanese media reports that China has asked Google to list the Senkaku islands under two names, the Japanese one and Diaoyutai (chinese name) - in light of the apparent territorial dispute.

After Google's fight with China over access to the market and freedom of speak, the company has less to lose by saying no but absolutely nothing to gain either. Google will probably dual list the island on google maps as asked.

Lastly, the rare earth export issue is still not resolved. This one is really bizarre and the world needs to know what is going on here.

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1013/TKY201010130515.html?ref=rss