Monday 30 January 2012

Japan, China and Korea: Territory versus Trade

Following on the ideas of China Bystander here, I wanted to take a look at how the territorial dispute is influencing regional cooperation in North-east Asia.

The Senkaku dispute is slowing getting out of control again, on 3 January several Japanese (local) politicians landed on a disputed island provoking official protest by Beijing. A few days later, the Japanese government saw fit to expand the powers of the Coast Guard to detain suspicious boats in the area, providing better (domestic) legal cover for a future arrest of Capt. Zhan. Again, to further bolster their position, the Government of Japan saw fit to name several small islets in disputed territory, with very boring names.

In response the Chinese side have expanded the area of their aerial maritime surveillance to include the disputed areas, with the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration stating that the twin-engine Harbin Y-12 can fly over the area.

I have already heard from the Japanese side that the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute had caused negotiations on a bilateral FTA and at the CMIM to be shelved as China refused to deal with Japan).

But on the other hand I had a sense that even if these events were being 'exploited' in bargaining positions at the official level, most Japanese people did not care. I guessed (hoped) this may be true also for the everyday Korean and Chinese too.

Fortunately some good polling has been done on this subject. A recent poll by Asahi in China, Korea and Japan found that most people still wanted a trilateral FTA to go ahead. The numbers were Japanese 52%, Korean 55% and Chinese 82% supporting a trilateral FTA. Intriguing given the posturing at the official level.

I hope that we can make a distinction between short term public outrage over a disputed territories and the very real but quite aggregate interest in just getting along in Northeast Asia.