A close look at high level meetings reveals that this explanation is flawed.
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In particular, the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 saw less visits to China than would be expected. These years too also saw Japan and India sign onto a strategic framework with the US and Australia which clearly is driven by concerns at some level about growing Chinese power. To an extent we could characterize these years as the "balancing" years.
But it is also clear that this pattern is a aberration, the correlation between high level visits to China and India is high. And with the exemption of the years cited above, Japan-India and Japan-China high level visits move in virtual lock-step. Indeed, 2008-09 saw both sets of meeting fall back to the pre-Koizumi levels and balance.
This suggests that continual, long term interests, both strategic and economic, is what motivates Japanese top level diplomacy, and that striking a balance between China and India is one of those interests. While the short term of Koizumi is noticable, acting overly interested in one or either party is just not good diplomacy in the long term.
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