Japan’s China policy: No re-adjustment towards Beijing.

Much has been made of late about the possibility of Japan drawing closer to China. I suggest that on the major issues, Japan’s China policy is unchanged under the DPJ, and unlikely to change.

Firstly, on the question of history, Hatoyama is unlikely to make major changes here. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hatoyama has no plans to visit Nanjing this year, and as far as MOFA is aware there is no plan for an apology of any form. Indeed, after rumors broke that there might be a “Hatayama to Nanjing, Hu to Hiroshima” swap this year, the only country not to check-in with the MOFA’s China desk about whether or not it were true was China itself, being aware that this was a dreamt up story by the French but accepted even in Japan. Yet as the recent conclusion of joint historical research by China and Japan reveals, major differences still remain in official interpretation of events. It seems unlikely that Hatoyama would visit Nanjing when the basic question of how many were killed still remains unsettled.

Secondly, on the issue of trade, Hatoyama is little different to the LDP. Hatoyama has proposed further research to be conducted into a Japan, China, Korea trilateral free trade agreement. And while this time it is official government-level research, there are no promises on the Japanese side and not much enthusiasm. No doubt a part of the reason for the elevation to official level is that the academics whom had conducted the informal research since 2001 had simply run out of areas to research.

No surprise that even now Hatoyama appears to looking for wiggle room by suggesting an investment treaty, (although a quick look at the way in which Hatayma handling Futenma suggests that wiggle is Hatoyama’s natural state). Indeed, post-LDP Japan’s real interest remains such an investment protection pact be signed either in addition, or even instead, of an FTA with China.

Of course, in any discussion of Japan’s FTA’s the agricultural issue is important – and the Ministry of Agriculture, Farming and Fishery has hardly changed its position. The MAFF is continuing to oppose any deal with China which includes agriculture (with China being Japan’s second largest supplier of food import, this rather nixes a deal unless the PM comes out clearly in favor). Of course, the establishment within the MOFA of a new FTA promotion facility is viewed generally an attack on the influence of the MAFF in FTA policy making (with the MAFF already on the backfoot) – but the target is more likely to be Australia than China at least for the time being. Indeed, Hatoyama’s administration remains positively appraised of Australia and might well be looking for new ways to further institutionalize the relationship.

Thirdly, in the field of security, Hatoyama has made no major changes. The issue of natural resource exploration by China in the East China Sea remains problematic. Foreign Minister Okada has raised Japan’s concerns with his opposite Yang Jiechi twice already, most recently on January 17th at which time Okada stated that “he would like to enter into negotiations to conclude international agreements promptly, and expressed desire for Minister Yang's cooperation and for him [Jiechi] to issue instructions to enable substantive progress to be made going forward, in contrast with the lack of progress so far.”

From the perspective of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this reflects a continuation of the China policy set out by the LDP in 2008 under “the Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests" Joint Statement. Under this Joint Statement, a commitment was made to resolve or at least ameliorate the political problems caused by Chinese exploration in East China Sea. Of course, the DPJ is still keen for military exchanges and the like to continue, but Japan’s posture on these core national interests has hardly softened.

Taken together, the Hatoyama administration has thus far changed little in Japan’s policy towards China.