Japan, China and Korea: Territory versus Trade

Following on the ideas of China Bystander here, I wanted to take a look at how the territorial dispute is influencing regional cooperation in North-east Asia.

The Senkaku dispute is slowing getting out of control again, on 3 January several Japanese (local) politicians landed on a disputed island provoking official protest by Beijing. A few days later, the Japanese government saw fit to expand the powers of the Coast Guard to detain suspicious boats in the area, providing better (domestic) legal cover for a future arrest of Capt. Zhan. Again, to further bolster their position, the Government of Japan saw fit to name several small islets in disputed territory, with very boring names.

In response the Chinese side have expanded the area of their aerial maritime surveillance to include the disputed areas, with the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration stating that the twin-engine Harbin Y-12 can fly over the area.

I have already heard from the Japanese side that the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute had caused negotiations on a bilateral FTA and at the CMIM to be shelved as China refused to deal with Japan).

But on the other hand I had a sense that even if these events were being 'exploited' in bargaining positions at the official level, most Japanese people did not care. I guessed (hoped) this may be true also for the everyday Korean and Chinese too.

Fortunately some good polling has been done on this subject. A recent poll by Asahi in China, Korea and Japan found that most people still wanted a trilateral FTA to go ahead. The numbers were Japanese 52%, Korean 55% and Chinese 82% supporting a trilateral FTA. Intriguing given the posturing at the official level.

I hope that we can make a distinction between short term public outrage over a disputed territories and the very real but quite aggregate interest in just getting along in Northeast Asia.

Senkakus, Japan public rattled

I am still thinking through this months East China Sea issue. But for the time being some observations on Japanese public's view on the issue.

It is no longer just the usual right-wing hacks which are calling China a threat and demanding a more robust response to China’s rise, but now also the main stream which is moving into an anti-China mood.

Newspapers: The left of center Asahi Newspaper run nearly five pages of its Saturday issue with the focus on Japan’s failure to stand up to China. Yomiuri has been averaging about the same of the last week, although less hawkish that than Asahi.

TV: The popular movie director Beat Takeshi joined the chorus on Newscaster on Saturday 25th, leading discussion on China as threat together with his guests. Newscaster probably matters more for public opinion than NHK in certain sections of the less educated in Japan. Interviews with Japanese reveal that most are unhappy with their government's handling, and would prefer an more robust response in the future. Statements of fear and anxiety towards China also are shown from everyday Japanese.

Street-level observations: At train stations and on the Shinkansen, electronic billboards flash the latest news about the Senkaku islands and people stop to look and voice concerns.

Official: Official results of Japan’s public sentiment towards major countries is due out in December and no major media have yet conducted an emergency poll. (still looking).

The results of a (highly unscientific) poll conducted in China on Sino-Japanese relations which revealled 93% of Chinese think the tension will be long term is being reported as news. A feed-back loop of 'they hate us, so we can not trust them' is starting up in japanese media.

Japan’s political vacuum, some thoughts.

The Yomiuri Shimbun has just released the results of its latest public opinion poll. Questions included “Do you support the DPJ”, and “who is the most suitable as Prime Minister.” Even though the DPJ (together with its coalition partners) holds a super-majority in Diet, and is therefore theoretically in a position to push through any and all reforms it sees fit, slipping popular support threatens to undermine the psychological basis for successful political leadership. Recall that former PM Koizumi’s ability to go over the head of his own party and directly appeal to the Japanese people was crucial to allowing his reforms to be successfully passed. Thus, the answers to the current polling questions are important in charting where the DPJ goes from here. The chart below summarizes the last six months; the blue line is “do not support Hatayama Cabinet.”

As you can see, the DPJ has fallen from a high of 75% support (red) to 33% and the blue line of “do not support” has gone from 17% to 56% - implying that most Japanese have gone from optimism to pessimism about this administration (see also here). That was certainly the feeling on the ground last month, but why?

The poll result supports Tobias Harris’s argument that the problem with the DPJ and its popularity is Hatoyama himself. In response to the question, “who is the most suitable as Prime Minister?”, Hatoyama name comes not first, but sixth. Indeed, even more bitterly for the DPJ, the opposition LDP Masazoe Yoichi comes first at 29%. This result gives Masazoe further ammunition in his struggle to become Leader of the Opposition against the incumbent Tanigaki. Hatayama even scored lower than his Foreign Minister Okada, Transport Minister Maehara, and Deputy Minister Kan but none exceeded 10% approval in any case.

There are various causes of this decline, but management of the Global Financial crisis seems not to be one of them. Rather domestic issues such as the corruption scandals plaguing the DPJ (focused mostly on Ozawa but Hatayama himself is also under scrutiny) are center stage. Problems relating to the relocation of the US military base at Futenma are also important, as is postal savings reform.

But overall the problem is a lack of “getting things done” – indeed 44% of Japanese cited this as the biggest problem of the Hatoyama administration. So rather than focusing on a project such as the East Asian Community which may or may not “succeed” (and how to even measure that), Hatayama’s next few months ought to focus on getting a clear success. Given his domestic situation, there are opportunities and risks for other countries wishing to cooperate with Japan, but overall Japan’s biggest contribution to East Asia will be to get its ship back in order.

Japan’s public perception of China: Are things on the mend with Hatoyama?

In my previous post I discussed Japanese popular sentiment and some of its internal contradictions. Here is a Chart I have generated from the National Polls, conducted by the Cabinet Office on various questions. This question is “Do you trust China?”, or perhaps, "do you feel China is a trustworthy country."

Chart first, discussion later.



What I think I see here is the marked effect of Hatoyama’s victory on Japanese public opinion towards China. Hatayama was elected in August, and assumed office on September 16th. The polling for the 2009 Cabinet Office Public Opinion Survey was carried out October, (15-25th). With all the rhetoric fresh and without actually having done anything, this is almost ideal timing to see what the effect of a regime change is on public perceptions. Of course, we must not discount the fact that Aso managed, dispute himself, not to cause any major trouble in the Sino-Japanese relationship and kept it on an even till. But this he inherited from Fukuda, and neither Abe, Aso or Fukuda between them the three of them were able to improve public opinion towards China, with trust at historic lows since the Koizumi period.

Digging into the data a little more, some interesting trends come out. Firstly, compared to last year, the overall improvement of little of 8% is a little misleading. The improvement is larger, because if we disaggregate the “Do not trust (at all)” and “Do not trust, rather than trust” then we see that movement toward the latter. Secondly, the big shift was not where it mattered. The 20 to 30 year old shifting 5%, in other words the “average” adjustment. The big shift was in the 50-60, and 60-70 year olds who already tended to have a higher trust. The recovery, in other words, has not returned Japan back to pre-Koizumi times, even among the section of the population most likely to make a difference in Japan’s future policy.

Raw data can be found here.

Pro-China, Pro-Yasukuni, Half Japanese.

In this month’s issue of Voice, a public poll was conducted looking at, among other things, Japan’s China policy. Polling on three questions in particular are quite interesting for what they say about the Japanese ability to both desire a friendly relationship with China and a prominent place for Yasukuni in the national psyche without seeing a contradiction in these goals.

Firstly, the numbers. In response to the question, “do you agree with the new Administration’s China policy; East Asian community, and East Sea Joint Development etc.”, half of respondents agreed and 35% disagreed. This shows again that after a few scary years under Koizumi, most Japanese still want a closer, “warmer” political relationship with their largest neighbor.

In response to the question “should the PM visit the Yasukuni shrine on August 15 [Remembrance Day]”, again half of respondents agreed. Despite the fact that China has made it very clear that improvement in the political are dependent on the PM not setting foot in the Shrine, still half of Japanese prioritize the PM’s ceremonial role as mourner in chief.

More intriguing, in response to the question “Should a seperate facility be created to allow for formal mourning of the war dead?” I.e. should the Yasukuni Shrine lose its monopoly on war bereavement and division of state and religion be restored? Answer, 58% opposed. Most Japan view the Yasukuni Shrine itself, in and of itself, as special – thereby preventing the promising work around that Koizumi had aired before being boxed into a corner.

Hatoyama clearly is trying to take the Japan-China to the next level. This can be seen in his symbolic displays in various international fora, the recent 600 man delegation to China and more recently rumors of Hatoyama to Nanjing – which if it occurred to involve a formal apology and the possible beginnings of real reconciliation between Japan and China. While all and sundry must be aware that Hatoyama will not be visiting Yasukuni in any formal capacity (he has promised this much) – underlying Japanese sentiments about the Shrine will complicate any reconciliation effort with China that Hatoyama’s administration might attempt.