Japan, China and Korea: Territory versus Trade

Following on the ideas of China Bystander here, I wanted to take a look at how the territorial dispute is influencing regional cooperation in North-east Asia.

The Senkaku dispute is slowing getting out of control again, on 3 January several Japanese (local) politicians landed on a disputed island provoking official protest by Beijing. A few days later, the Japanese government saw fit to expand the powers of the Coast Guard to detain suspicious boats in the area, providing better (domestic) legal cover for a future arrest of Capt. Zhan. Again, to further bolster their position, the Government of Japan saw fit to name several small islets in disputed territory, with very boring names.

In response the Chinese side have expanded the area of their aerial maritime surveillance to include the disputed areas, with the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration stating that the twin-engine Harbin Y-12 can fly over the area.

I have already heard from the Japanese side that the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute had caused negotiations on a bilateral FTA and at the CMIM to be shelved as China refused to deal with Japan).

But on the other hand I had a sense that even if these events were being 'exploited' in bargaining positions at the official level, most Japanese people did not care. I guessed (hoped) this may be true also for the everyday Korean and Chinese too.

Fortunately some good polling has been done on this subject. A recent poll by Asahi in China, Korea and Japan found that most people still wanted a trilateral FTA to go ahead. The numbers were Japanese 52%, Korean 55% and Chinese 82% supporting a trilateral FTA. Intriguing given the posturing at the official level.

I hope that we can make a distinction between short term public outrage over a disputed territories and the very real but quite aggregate interest in just getting along in Northeast Asia.

East Asian Free Trade Area is looking more likely!

This year has seen significant progress in negotiations, the outcome of which were only revealed at the ASEAN Plus Three summit in November. Early indications that an agreement might finally be reached occurred in August at the 14^th ASEAN Economic Ministers Plus Three (AEM+3) Meeting in Indonesia. The final communication of which welcomed “the joint proposal by China and Japan, ‘Initiative on Speeding up the Establishment of an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA)’.

Until this joint proposal by China and Japan on the future of an East Asian Trade Area, the whole process had been held hostage to the Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry. This deadlock was eventually broken by the worsening global economic situation and, relatedly, the United States bid to boost its flagging growth through exports which drove a return to Asia via the Trans Pacific Partnership. For China, the TPP is seen as particularly threatening as its intellectual property and investment protection requirements will pose a formidable barrier to joining – even if China were actually to be invited (which it is not). This new reality seems to have been enough to shift China’s priorities towards reaching an agreement in East Asia, even if that meant moving towards Japan’s position on issues of coverage and membership.

The outcome of this shift in strategic perceptions was the joint proposal by China and Japan calling for the East Asian Free Trade Area to cover goods, services and investment, i.e. an agreement which brings in Japan’s WTO-plus interests. Since the outset of negotiations on the EAFTA, Japan has been focussed on the investment related issues (and rather less interested in tariff liberalization). Since Japan has few tariffs left to cut, and those that remain are in the politically sensitive agricultural area, any EAFTA which focussed solely on tariff measures would not be of much interest to Japan politically. Specifically with regards to China, Japan has been unwilling to enter an agreement which does not address its concerns about its firms ability to confidently invest in the growing Chinese market — indeed, it is partly for this reason that the bilateral China-Japan FTA remains frozen. However, outside the bilateral negotiations and in the context of the EAFTA, China is willing to discuss Japan’s wider set of economic interests. This year Japan and China have jointly sponsored setting up three working groups to deal with trade in goods, services and investment respectively which will begin work in April of 2012, with the start of negotiations on the final text scheduled to begin in November of next year.

More importantly, the joint agreement virtually concludes the long standing disagreement over membership. China had been adamant about the EAFTA being limited to the ASEAN Plus Three process only, however it appears that the final agreement will include a wider membership than that. The East Asia Summit grouping of Australia, New Zealand and India is clearly the next logical step.

It is likely that Australia, New Zealand and India ­­— each of whom have their own ASEAN + 1 Free Trade Agreement in place ­­­— would be brought into the new trade area via the so-called “ASEAN + +” institutional mechanism. While the set up of this mechanism is not yet finalized, it is clear that it will aim to “roll up” the series of ASEAN + 1 agreements. The framework is being negotiated at the ASEAN Plus Working Groups, which are considering rules of origin, tariff nomenclature, customs procedures, and economic cooperation. These will feed into the working groups on trade, services and investment to provide the single template agreement.

Yet there remain some major hurdles. Firstly, the terminology has not been settled, with both the EAFTA and CEPEA still being bantered around. This suggests that the Chinese bargaining position has not been dropped, and there may still be some tussles over the membership. Secondly, while the Japanese and Chinese leaders have directed the bureaucrats to start negotiations, political leadership will be required to sign the agreement into force. However, the Heads of Government only enter the process next year, and in the mean time another flare up in Sino-Japanese relations could put everything back into deep freeze.

Notwithstanding those issues, it is clear that the halting trend towards the realization of an EAFTA is progressing. While there will no doubt be more setbacks, an EAFTA now seems to be more a question of when than if.

A more polished version appears on the East Asia Forum here.

How to waste an opportunity: Ira Kan

Kan Naoto managed to survive the no confidence moved against him, in fact he 'won' hansomely with vote of 152 for to 293 against.

Wow, Kan appears to be slowing but surely winning against the influence of Ozawa faction. This is the third major win. Maybe Japan will turn the corner yet!

Or not.

In order to defeat the no confidence motion, Kan had to promise to step down in the near term (undefined).

His win has set himself up as (yet another) lame duck PM in Japan. Great.

Japan is therefore still on course to play the master game of strategic irrelevance - and they are not going to like the cards dealt them.

Sino-Japanese relations: fleeting flirtation or long-term engagement?

This weekend (21-22 May) the leaders of China and Korea are hosted by Japan for the Fourth Trilateral Summit, the first such Summit since the triple disaster of March 11. As a part of this visit, Wen Jiabao and Lee Myung-bak will travel to Fukushima to demonstrate their nation’s continuing support of Japan’s reconstruction.

Indeed, both China and South Korea have already contributed significantly during Japan’s disaster response in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, providing emergency relief teams and the provision of material support. The large (and unprecedented) level of support that China offered, especially the prompt dispatch of a Chinese search and rescue team, has led some to posit that warming relationships between Japan, China and Korea may be the silver-lining to Japan’s national tragedy. Especially with regard to China, with whom Japan’s relationship slumped precariously after a fishing infraction turned into a territorial dispute in November of 2010, the quake represented for some a possible circuit-breaker.

Certainly there has been an improvement in the relationship at the societal level. China’s media commented very favourably about the Japanese people’s resilience and lawfulness under the extreme duress of the power, food and water shortages – not to mention failing communications and concerns about family members. The Chinese media wondered aloud if China could ever reach such levels of civility. That peers in Asia were viewing the Japanese societal response favourably was a story which was in turn picked up the Japanese media and became a source of national pride for the many Japanese doing it hard. At that moment the empathy and mutual respect between the Japanese and Chinese (and others around the world) was at its zenith.

Yet in the longer term it is very unlikely that the earthquake will mark a turning point in the Sino-Japanese relationship. This is because tensions in the Sino-Japanese relationship are due to more than societal distrust but the basic strategic interests and perceptions of the two powers.

In this context it worth remembering that in the aftermath of the triple disaster China’s full offer of a PLAN hospital ship and expanded rescue team were not accepted by Japan.

This refusal by Japan was due the fundamentally different strategic orientations of the two countries and a (reasonable) lack of trust of the Chinese military in Japanese policy circles, not to mention the political implications of inviting Chinese military personal into Japan to work next to the US forces under Operation Tomodachi. Japanese politicians too would have had some difficulty in explaining a major Chinese presence after recent and damaging disputes – especially over the export of rare earth (a subject that Kan has flagged for discussion during the Trilateral Summit). Japan already made clear its order of preference (and trust) during the crisis, and despite the positive appraisals of Chinese assistance in the media, the fact is that Japan accepted only limited Chinese assistance due to a fundamental differences and competing interests.

Even the initial societal level warming up of the relationship is starting to cool. The Chinese media is reporting negatively on the choice of Fukushima as feature of the Trilateral summit, while discussion is Japan about how to cope a regional order that China is increasing being able to influence and in which Japan will play a junior role is heating up. Opinion within Japan is divided. The influential journalist Yoichi Funabashi has been arguing that Japan must ‘cleave to’ China in the future, but he acknowledges that a reorientation towards China would require political courage – a commodity in desperately short supply.

There is therefore no reason to expect that Japan’s even weaker domestic political and economic situation after the crisis will help to improve the Sino-Japanese relationship in the long term. Rather, despite the current warming of ties at the societal level, the most likely course for this important relationship is unfortunately the reassertion of old and competitive patterns of interaction.

Joel Rathus is a recent PhD graduate from Adelaide University, an EAF scholar and a regular contributor to the East Asia Forum. His other posts can be found here.

Japan and territory, the cat is away?

As Japanese politicians have turned towards dealing with the reconstruction effort, and with the hawkish Maehara standing down over a scandal, Japan's neighbors are considering their choices.

Alot has already been noted on China's positive and friendly response, more than phone calls, china sent to Japan personnel to help with the disaster in the same way that Japan had sent personnel (JSDF) to China to help during their earthquake in the West. (http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/15/opportunity-in-crisis-sino-japanese-relations-after-the-earthquake/)

Korea has also been sympathetic. But the Korea defense establish has taken the opportunity to press forward its claims on the takeshima/dokdo islands. see,

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0413/TKY201104120653.html?ref=rss
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0412/TKY201104120480.html?ref=rss
http://rss.asahi.com/click.phdo?i=83f4ab513f8b7ad000ad7d990a13c63a

Give a man a fish: Japanese fisherman becoming bureaucrats?

Due to the high levels of radiation found in Squid caught by fishermen in Ibaraki-shi (near Fukushima) a decision has been made not to fish - fairly obviously this is because they can not sell the produce has it is detrimental to public health.

More curiuosly, the local government decided to hire of the fishermen out of work as local government officials for one year. I have no idea what they will do, neither do they.

Compensation is one thing, but taking these men out of the workforce for one year to twiddle their thumbs is not a solution - although in the short term more boots on the ground for reconstruction may not be a bad thing.

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0409/TKY201104090353.html?ref=rss

Unfortunate event in East China Sea

Maehara Seiji pretty made his name on the back the Senkaku dispute September of last year. His name was mud in Beijing, which ironically, is an advantage of sorts. The newly appointed Matsumoto Takeaki is unlikely to has the punch to be able to take the fight to Beijing over the East China Sea issue and will be a responsive player. As much as anything, the upcoming trilateral meeting between the CJK make making a stand on the start of production (extraction of Oil) by China's state owned SNOOC in the disputed areas (Shirakaba) too difficult I suspect.

While Chief Cabinet Sect. Edano has noted with concern the development of CNOOC going into the area to start production, he is waiting before responding.

I think Maehara would have picked up the phone and starting making a fuss already.

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0309/TKY201103090225.html?ref=rss

Maehara Resigns

Maehara seiji has resign as Foreign Minister.

Initially I expected he would fight off the charges, which are frankly a little ridiculous. If Ozawa can fight through decades of scandal, then Maehara certainly could whip this obviously minor case.

However, it is clear that Maehara is in for the long game (perhaps a little too obviously!). His decision to steep down reflects his belief that Kan will not be able to win the next election, which is now more likely to be called than ever.

Evidence: on the way out, Maehara very statesman-like said "an election would be for the national interest" - here.

Gillard to Tokyo: pushing on a string?

Julia Gillard will visit Japan from April 20 including a summit with Kan Naoto. It is unlikely however that Australia’s efforts will result in any major deals being brokered at this meeting as Japan’s ruling party continuing to fragment and as Japan’s limited political dynamism is hit further.

The major issue which both Australia and Japan would like to be able to resolve is the Free Trade Agreement negotiations. These negotiations have been tortured, with liberalization of agricultural goods being the chief problem. The negotiations, which began in 2007, were most recently this February and marked a return to the table after nearly ten months hiatus. Yet the official negotiators from Japan and Australia were still unable to make a break through, prompting Trade Minister Kaieda Banri to call for the negotiations to be resolved at the political level. This is an appropriate response, as the Agreement was initially proposed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo as part of a political calculus of the benefits of such an agreement to both countries. It is in this context that Gillard is making her four day long visit to Japan, a visit aimed to resolve at the political level the issues still outstanding in the FTA.

But while success would be quite a coup for either leader, there are good reasons to doubt that visit may be in vain.

The DJP is imploding over the issue of trade liberalization. Kan Naoto has been leading with a concept of “re-opening Japan”, the flagship of which has been the joining Trans-Pacific Partnership. It is important to understand that Japan-Australia FTA is perceived as a litmus test for the viability of including Japan in the TPP process. Thus Japan’s membership in the TPP will come only when others are convinced that Japan is serious about comprehensive liberalization of trade – including the political sensitive agricultural sector.

But already the Party has split on the TPP issue. The former Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Yamada Masahiko is leading a group of parliamentarians bitterly opposed to the TPP. The group, which is called the “Serious Consideration of the TPP”, is nearly 180 Diet-men strong and announced its establishment on the 24 February. Moreover, the Group has organized a series of public hearings on the dangers of the TPP led by a prominent economist Uzawa Hirofumi which directly undercuts the Kan administration’s public information session in the rural regions which address the benefits of agricultural reform. The opposition to the TPP is also a stalking horse for opposition to an Australia-Japan FTA which includes agriculture. Indeed, Yamada Masahiko (Ozawa faction) is strongly opposed to such an FTA and has written publicly about the costs of signing onto an FTA with Australia.

Kan’s leadership of the DPJ is also in question. While there is no obvious challenger to leadership of the Party, the most recent public polling showed low support for the Kan administration (21%). The fact that Kan Naoto might well lead the Party to defeat in the next election has made it difficult for Kan to prevent individual parliamentarians from taking up local issues at the cost of national strategy. While the announcement of an FTA with Australia, as a prelude to joining and eventually acceding to the TPP, might help Kan somewhat recover political momentum, it is unlikely to make a major difference and as such Kan is likely to focus his efforts and what remains of political capital elsewhere. Moreover, although the current administration wishes to reverse the current situation of rural votes (which overwhelming, even passionately oppose FTAs) holding a disproportionate influence (a rural vote can be worth an ‘unconstitutional’ 2.5 urban votes), were an election to be called it is likely that the DJP would lose its majority and hence government.

In conclusion, it is unlikely that Kan Naoto and the leading DPJ have the political will (or coherence) to be able to meet the expectations of Julia Gillard and the ALP on the degree and type of liberalization within the FTA. Rather, the summit is likely to produce an agreement on Japanese investment into Australian rare earth and some other bureaucratic matters (replacing Mclean).

We don't owe you anything

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Ma Zhao Xu (馬朝旭) has gone on record stating that Japan does not have any grounds to claim damages for the Senkaku/Diaoyutai island collision.

Reason: Because China asked Japan for compensation.

This response is due to the Japan Coast Guard recent delivery of a demand for compensation to the (now heroic) Capt. Zhan.

Still, Ma is tame choice for a response. At least China did not wheel on the Ultimo Ratio Regis known as Spokeswoman Jiang Yu (scary - watch her in action here).

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0213/TKY201102120264.html?ref=rss

Then who is the b*tch?

Maehara Seiji, MOFA Minister on Japan, discusses the Russia-Japan relationship as similar to Male-Female relations. Reason: "Because a Peace Treaty (still unsigned since 1945) will be based on the mutual feeling of how we important we are".

Maehara adds, "But those islands are so ours, boy-o"

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0213/TKY201102130029.html?ref=rss

Japan and Australia FTA resumed

After the China-Australia FTA negotiations were restarted last year, the Japan-Australia FTA has also resumed. Maybe a break was for the best, certainly demonstrated that Australia can wait.

More interesting, after Kevin Rudd trip to Japan last year and the positive sounding he got on the FTA, there is evidence that Japan is trying serious to get the negotiations up.

Maehara Seiji in his recent speech to Diet on Foreign Policy (here) called for early conclusion to negotiations with Australia. Maybe by the end of this year we will have the framework agreement in place.

Yasukuni calms situation (reverso-land post)

Event: 66 Japanese Diet-men go to the Yasukuni Shrine (19OCT2010)11am.

Argument and Significance: This is likely to inflame China nationalist passions by conflating territory and history issues in Sino-Japanese relations. This will impact on ability to reach a political conclusion to the dispute (dragging it on).

Analysis: As Anti-Japanese protest continue to rock China (esp. Sichuan province), the decision of a number of Japanese Diet-men to visit the Yasukuni Shrine today is likely be have negative effects.

The first and most important is simply that it puts unneeded pressure on the Chinese Gov't which already calling for calm.

Secondly, it undercuts Japan gov't's own message of remaining calm, both to its own citizens and to the Chinese side.

Lastly, by conflating history and territory issues, Japan is making it easier for the East China Sea to go from a failed attempt at a 'Sea of fraternity' to an outright 'Sea of Hostility.' The Sea of Hostility is most likely to be of an unofficial nature initially, but no doubt Chinese nationalists and Japanese nationalist will be getting in their boats soon. While China has been preventing such boats from launching thus far, the CCP's ability to continue doing so is uncertain.

Senkakus, Japan public rattled

I am still thinking through this months East China Sea issue. But for the time being some observations on Japanese public's view on the issue.

It is no longer just the usual right-wing hacks which are calling China a threat and demanding a more robust response to China’s rise, but now also the main stream which is moving into an anti-China mood.

Newspapers: The left of center Asahi Newspaper run nearly five pages of its Saturday issue with the focus on Japan’s failure to stand up to China. Yomiuri has been averaging about the same of the last week, although less hawkish that than Asahi.

TV: The popular movie director Beat Takeshi joined the chorus on Newscaster on Saturday 25th, leading discussion on China as threat together with his guests. Newscaster probably matters more for public opinion than NHK in certain sections of the less educated in Japan. Interviews with Japanese reveal that most are unhappy with their government's handling, and would prefer an more robust response in the future. Statements of fear and anxiety towards China also are shown from everyday Japanese.

Street-level observations: At train stations and on the Shinkansen, electronic billboards flash the latest news about the Senkaku islands and people stop to look and voice concerns.

Official: Official results of Japan’s public sentiment towards major countries is due out in December and no major media have yet conducted an emergency poll. (still looking).

The results of a (highly unscientific) poll conducted in China on Sino-Japanese relations which revealled 93% of Chinese think the tension will be long term is being reported as news. A feed-back loop of 'they hate us, so we can not trust them' is starting up in japanese media.

Australia: not worth it

Japan's Cabinet Office which runs the Foreign Policy Opinion Polling has had its budget slashed.

One of the unfortunate results is that polling on Japan's popular sentiment towards Australia will not be conducted this year - or subsequent years.

Currently only five countries are identified for specific treatment; America, China, Korea, Russia and India. Australia and New Zealand are not specified, instead being called 'pacific countries'.

This comes as a blow for those interested in Japan-Australia relations, and alternatives will have to be found.

Japan's priorities shifting?

Yesterday (25-08-2010), Japan's Foreign Minister Okada issued a new policy to shift 100 diplomats from the developed countries to new emerging countries. The re-focus away from traditional western powers towards the likes of India, South Africa, Brazil and Turkey will be manifested institutionally in the creation of a "Emerging Countries Bureau" at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.* In particular, the Japan's embassy in the EU (economic branch) is to have its numbers reduced to make way for increases elsewhere.

Citing the development of the G20 as a forum in which emerging powers are holding great sway Okada said, "as a power shift in the world economy occurs, so too does the Ministry staff. Moving quickly is very important."**

There is also movement to bring in the influential (but not ministry-level) institutions of JETRO, JBIC, and JICA under Foreign Affair's control by bundling them in with the other embassy functions.

See article here.

* Not the first Bureau that Okada has set up, also the 'FTA Promotion Bureau' has been significant.

** "世界経済のパワーシフトに応じて、外交の人員も変えていく。迅速に行っていくことが非常に大事"

Whaling: No news is good news.

Today the Australian government decided to take the Japanese government to the ICJ over the issue of research whaling.

As the Australian reported, both Smith and Okada as Foreign Ministers emphasized the importance of not letting the issue affect the bilateral relationship. While this decision is no doubt a little foolish strategically - as Lowy's Cook noted today- this folly is offset but the genuine lack of interest in the issue by Japan as I have suggested earlier.

Evidence for this is the fact that 'Australia takes Japan to ICJ over Whaling' did not break on the main page of the Yomiuri Shimbun's online top stories for any length of time (3 hours perhaps), and was pushed out by the 3pm update by events in Franch, Iran and the NPT. There was a short piece by Singapore based journalist Okazaki (lifted from reuters sources I imagine) noting only the facts. Fishing around Yahoo news garnered few extra reports, three.

No doubt an opinion will be forthcoming, but I suspect that the focus will be events in court surrounding the Acid Milk Attack by Peter Bethune. I have not seen any television reporting of it yet.

Perhaps this event will prove a game-changer in the bilateral relationship between Japan and Australia. But it still seems unlikely to me.

Japan’s political vacuum, some thoughts.

The Yomiuri Shimbun has just released the results of its latest public opinion poll. Questions included “Do you support the DPJ”, and “who is the most suitable as Prime Minister.” Even though the DPJ (together with its coalition partners) holds a super-majority in Diet, and is therefore theoretically in a position to push through any and all reforms it sees fit, slipping popular support threatens to undermine the psychological basis for successful political leadership. Recall that former PM Koizumi’s ability to go over the head of his own party and directly appeal to the Japanese people was crucial to allowing his reforms to be successfully passed. Thus, the answers to the current polling questions are important in charting where the DPJ goes from here. The chart below summarizes the last six months; the blue line is “do not support Hatayama Cabinet.”

As you can see, the DPJ has fallen from a high of 75% support (red) to 33% and the blue line of “do not support” has gone from 17% to 56% - implying that most Japanese have gone from optimism to pessimism about this administration (see also here). That was certainly the feeling on the ground last month, but why?

The poll result supports Tobias Harris’s argument that the problem with the DPJ and its popularity is Hatoyama himself. In response to the question, “who is the most suitable as Prime Minister?”, Hatoyama name comes not first, but sixth. Indeed, even more bitterly for the DPJ, the opposition LDP Masazoe Yoichi comes first at 29%. This result gives Masazoe further ammunition in his struggle to become Leader of the Opposition against the incumbent Tanigaki. Hatayama even scored lower than his Foreign Minister Okada, Transport Minister Maehara, and Deputy Minister Kan but none exceeded 10% approval in any case.

There are various causes of this decline, but management of the Global Financial crisis seems not to be one of them. Rather domestic issues such as the corruption scandals plaguing the DPJ (focused mostly on Ozawa but Hatayama himself is also under scrutiny) are center stage. Problems relating to the relocation of the US military base at Futenma are also important, as is postal savings reform.

But overall the problem is a lack of “getting things done” – indeed 44% of Japanese cited this as the biggest problem of the Hatoyama administration. So rather than focusing on a project such as the East Asian Community which may or may not “succeed” (and how to even measure that), Hatayama’s next few months ought to focus on getting a clear success. Given his domestic situation, there are opportunities and risks for other countries wishing to cooperate with Japan, but overall Japan’s biggest contribution to East Asia will be to get its ship back in order.

Lowy Linkage

Lowy Institute's Malcolm Cook and I had an exchange on the state of Japan-Australia relationship. Linkage here,

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/03/17/Japan-Australia-relations-Signs-of-damage.aspx

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/03/23/Japan-Australia-relations-just-fine.aspx

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/03/24/Australia-Japan-relations-are-not-fine.aspx

A good exchange of ideas, and informative for all and sundry. Hurrah.

Japan-India and Japan-China: Evidence of competition positive but mixed

It is often suggested that Japan's growing relations with India are due in part to a desire to balance China's influence. Specifically, that during the Koizumi administration, failure to secure top level meetings with China's leaders (due to Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits), drove Japan to build up its relationship with India (and Australia).

A close look at high level meetings reveals that this explanation is flawed.

Source: MOFA Homepage, India and China Basic Information (Japanese).



In particular, the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 saw less visits to China than would be expected. These years too also saw Japan and India sign onto a strategic framework with the US and Australia which clearly is driven by concerns at some level about growing Chinese power. To an extent we could characterize these years as the "balancing" years.

But it is also clear that this pattern is a aberration, the correlation between high level visits to China and India is high. And with the exemption of the years cited above, Japan-India and Japan-China high level visits move in virtual lock-step. Indeed, 2008-09 saw both sets of meeting fall back to the pre-Koizumi levels and balance.

This suggests that continual, long term interests, both strategic and economic, is what motivates Japanese top level diplomacy, and that striking a balance between China and India is one of those interests. While the short term of Koizumi is noticable, acting overly interested in one or either party is just not good diplomacy in the long term.