Unconvinced by Shiraishi’s column (Yomiuri)

I know Shiraishi to be something of a minimalist, and he is true to form here, arguing that the US-alliance and East Asian community building do not run at cross purposes, the reason being that the DPJ is not trying to unwind the alliance relationship.

Specifically, Shiraishi argues that Hatoyama has been criticized because people tend to think about international relations in a zero-sum manner, when in fact it is not true in this case. Shirashi argues that Japan is able to maintain the US-centered alliance hub-and-spokes regional order while also constructing a new regional order which excludes the US. While in theory the two structures could run parallel, in practice it is unlikely to occur. Firstly, there is the problem of Japan’s actual national interests – which does not necessarily correspond to Hatoyama’s rhetoric. And secondly, there is problem of perception gap in the China-America-Japan strategic triangle

One problem is that Japan’s interests lie with both the US security guarantee (chiefly from China) and excellent political relations and integration with East Asia (chiefly with China). As Shiraishi himself has argued previously, East Asian is economic gravity is moving to China even as the US remains at the center of regional security with Japan caught between the two.

What this means is that as long as Japan feels it is necessity to maintain the U.S. alliance, it is unlikely to simultaneously feel that China can be trusted enough for the kind of deep European-style cooperation that Hatoyama has envisioned. The alliance is hedge against a threat, and no state will actually cooperate with a threatening partner – even Japan.

Let it be remembered that each act of East Asia regionalism thus far has occurred due to failings of the United States, and the consequential shift in Japan’s priorities towards Asia. The current financial crisis has been another such example, with calls within Japan (and China) for internal demand driven growth being short-hand for less dependence on the vagaries of the US, thus consequently greater focus on each other and the region. But each time Japan has not liked what it saw in China and has returned to the US fold, will this time be any different?

The second problem with Shiraishi’s argument is that he does not factor in the current perceptions of the other major players – the US and China. Firstly, the US historically has not viewed regionalism in East Asia positively – even APEC is linked closely to global institutions like the WTO. Under the current Obama administration the US has been more positive about East Asian regionalism, on one proviso – that the US be included. If that proviso is not met, there is every reason to believe that the US will return to a negative position on regionalism. In fact, the United States has no reason to provide regional security to East Asia (through the alliance framework) if they are going to be excluded politically from the region, or face additional economic barriers. Is Hatoyama really going to the one to say no to the US?

In the case of China, integration with Japan is not a politically cost-free endeavor. The CCP’s regime legitimacy depends now on continued economic growth to be sure, but historically its mandate is derived from successfully repelling the Japanese invader. Overcoming these political hurdles (presumably from the PLA) is possible, but it is unlikely as long as American troops are based in Japan. Thus, even if Shiraishi was right about Japan being post-strategic, its putative partner in East Asia is clearly not.

Indeed, Shiraishi seems to believe that the U.S.-alliance can be used to stabilize the balance of power while the EAc can be used to sustain economic growth via the creation of shared technical rules; a sort of narrower (“closed”?) APEC perhaps. If that is all there was to it then mutual co-existence is possible between the two structures.

But while the East Asia community (EAc) is currently envisaged as chiefly an economic community, founded on a Free Trade Area and perhaps later a common currency – it is clearly going to also have a political function as well. One would not expect a unified East Asian foreign policy anytime soon, but the EAc would in time demand it have a final say concerning matters within East Asia. This would be problematic for the United States at best.

In short, Shiraishi has tried to strip out the political connotations of the EAc and the U.S.-alliance and just examine the two structures in a minimalistic and functionalist manner. However, this type of analysis fails to appreciate that the political meaning attached to these structures differs in each of the major actors.