Japan’s public perception of China: Are things on the mend with Hatoyama?

In my previous post I discussed Japanese popular sentiment and some of its internal contradictions. Here is a Chart I have generated from the National Polls, conducted by the Cabinet Office on various questions. This question is “Do you trust China?”, or perhaps, "do you feel China is a trustworthy country."

Chart first, discussion later.



What I think I see here is the marked effect of Hatoyama’s victory on Japanese public opinion towards China. Hatayama was elected in August, and assumed office on September 16th. The polling for the 2009 Cabinet Office Public Opinion Survey was carried out October, (15-25th). With all the rhetoric fresh and without actually having done anything, this is almost ideal timing to see what the effect of a regime change is on public perceptions. Of course, we must not discount the fact that Aso managed, dispute himself, not to cause any major trouble in the Sino-Japanese relationship and kept it on an even till. But this he inherited from Fukuda, and neither Abe, Aso or Fukuda between them the three of them were able to improve public opinion towards China, with trust at historic lows since the Koizumi period.

Digging into the data a little more, some interesting trends come out. Firstly, compared to last year, the overall improvement of little of 8% is a little misleading. The improvement is larger, because if we disaggregate the “Do not trust (at all)” and “Do not trust, rather than trust” then we see that movement toward the latter. Secondly, the big shift was not where it mattered. The 20 to 30 year old shifting 5%, in other words the “average” adjustment. The big shift was in the 50-60, and 60-70 year olds who already tended to have a higher trust. The recovery, in other words, has not returned Japan back to pre-Koizumi times, even among the section of the population most likely to make a difference in Japan’s future policy.

Raw data can be found here.

Anecdote: Only in Japan, I hope.

In Japan, where marriage itself is an institution under threat, a new phenomenon of actors taking the place bridesmaids, best-men, friends and family in wedding ceremonies is increasing.

The demand is great enough that some companies specialize in providing actors to stand in at Wedding. One such company “Wedding Assist”, said every year sees more demand. It already has 30 actors as members of staff. Another “freelancer” took over one hundred jobs as a stand-in friend last year.

These actors are often given quite specific instructions, such details of how they met the wife (it is normally women who request actors) and what to say. In some cases, actors requested to give a speech, to bless the marriage. In one case, the company was asked to provide actor to play the parents, brothers and sisters of one woman – the whole family.

Often the actors are hired by one party (the bride) without the knowledge of the husband. One woman confessed that she had hired actors because she could not fill her quota of friends for the wedding ceremony. She felt so embarrassed that she could not tell her husband, and instead hired actors. She had changed jobs so many times that she had lost all connection to her friends. Another woman said that after she quit Uni her friends circle had collapsed.

These women had no time for a hobby, or religious service, and no social network outside of work or Uni. But in a society under economic pressure those networks are failing. A society on the edge, the isolation of Tokyo and other big cities in Japan is truly turning out some strange social phenomena.

This was inspired from the late night news story about marriage in Japan. Not normally an area I care much about, but it chimed with my experiences of Japan. The story was called “Muen Shakai”, perhaps translated best as “A Society Without Social Bonds (Friends).”

Pro-China, Pro-Yasukuni, Half Japanese.

In this month’s issue of Voice, a public poll was conducted looking at, among other things, Japan’s China policy. Polling on three questions in particular are quite interesting for what they say about the Japanese ability to both desire a friendly relationship with China and a prominent place for Yasukuni in the national psyche without seeing a contradiction in these goals.

Firstly, the numbers. In response to the question, “do you agree with the new Administration’s China policy; East Asian community, and East Sea Joint Development etc.”, half of respondents agreed and 35% disagreed. This shows again that after a few scary years under Koizumi, most Japanese still want a closer, “warmer” political relationship with their largest neighbor.

In response to the question “should the PM visit the Yasukuni shrine on August 15 [Remembrance Day]”, again half of respondents agreed. Despite the fact that China has made it very clear that improvement in the political are dependent on the PM not setting foot in the Shrine, still half of Japanese prioritize the PM’s ceremonial role as mourner in chief.

More intriguing, in response to the question “Should a seperate facility be created to allow for formal mourning of the war dead?” I.e. should the Yasukuni Shrine lose its monopoly on war bereavement and division of state and religion be restored? Answer, 58% opposed. Most Japan view the Yasukuni Shrine itself, in and of itself, as special – thereby preventing the promising work around that Koizumi had aired before being boxed into a corner.

Hatoyama clearly is trying to take the Japan-China to the next level. This can be seen in his symbolic displays in various international fora, the recent 600 man delegation to China and more recently rumors of Hatoyama to Nanjing – which if it occurred to involve a formal apology and the possible beginnings of real reconciliation between Japan and China. While all and sundry must be aware that Hatoyama will not be visiting Yasukuni in any formal capacity (he has promised this much) – underlying Japanese sentiments about the Shrine will complicate any reconciliation effort with China that Hatoyama’s administration might attempt.

Haiti Earthquake, China and Japan

The recent and terrible earthquake in Haiti has revealed an interesting development in Japan's reporting of China.

On NHK TV News, the role of China in the international rescue effort is attracting more attention than that of Japan's own. The use of words such as "China arrived first and quickly put up its national flag" is unnecessarily evocative - creating the image of China stretching out its power world-wide. Japan it seems, really has China on the mind.

Of course, to an extend that is justifiable. China's role in Haiti is probably larger than Japan's. In fact, China had (before the quake) over one thousand riot police in Haiti to assist the UN Peacekeeping Operation (MINUSTAH) compared to Japan's presence of zero boots on ground. In fact, some of the Chinese PKO police (4 apparently) are currently missing - and are likely dead.

Japan has offered a cheque to Haiti (worth $5 mil.) and a S&R team.

Any wonder the Japanese are feeling in awe of China?

ERIA: Centrality, Odd men out, and quest for regional “research” leadership.

Previously, Malcolm Cook at the Lowy Interpreter and I briefly exchanged notes on the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) and its meaning in the broader East Asian context. I should like to continue those thoughts here, arguing that the story of ERIA neatly encapsulates the story of East Asian regionalism. I will show that ERIA’s formation is not a sign of strength of East Asian regionalism but another yet manifestation of the contest for centrality in East Asia between China and Japan.

The order of the title is no accident. I tend to believe that without a clear central leader, it is impossible to define regional membership (let alone borderline cases like odd men in). Indeed, contestation over the borders of the region (such as in East Asia today) is a good indication that the position of central leader is itself contested (chiefly between China and Japan). Under these conditions, any field even the esoteric (almost irrelevantly so) field of semi-formal research into economic regionalism acquires a political connotation.

So, what is ERIA? From a technocratic point of view, the ERIA is a research body designed to help with policy development and coordination in East Asia. But politically, it represents a Japanese leadership bid in response to China’s growing influence in the field of regionalism research. Specifically, Japan’s concerns were raised by China bid to house the Network of East Asia Thinktanks (NEAT) – an idea based on the recommendation of the East Asian Study Group (the first annual conference of which was held in China in 2003).

In response, Japanese policy-makers started to propose alternative groups to carry out research. Japan first pushed for the Asian Development Bank to take on this role, but meeting US resistance (and no doubt limited, if any, Chinese support at the ADB’s Board of Executives), shifted its attention to the ASEAN+3 research groups where Japanese research institutes were doing well. However, neither provided the leadership dividends Japan was after – the only option then was to start up its own “independent” research institution. Enter ERIA stage right.

Building on then Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Nikai’s proposal for a 16 party FTA, Japan’s former PM Abe called for the creation of ERIA at the 2007 ASEAN+3. ERIA was to be a research clearing house and policy coordination facility – a sort of OECD for Asia, minus the Charter and all the western legalistic trapping. At the 3rd East Asian Summit in 2008, the ERIA idea was approved unanimously – and debate shifted on where to base the secretariat.

Not withstanding the fact that Japan was to provide the money (and most of the brains) for this enterprise, ASEAN insisted on deciding amongst itself where to base the ERIA. The intense diplomacy among ASEAN nations for the privilege of housing the ERIA only subsided when the decision was made to temporary house in the ASEAN secretariat in Jarkarta, Indonesia. Thus while officially the ERIA is only temporary in Jarkarta, the green light has gone ahead to build it its own building, something of a fait accompli for Indonesia although unlikely to garner the kind of trust ERIA will require to do its work.

I am inclined to believe that this outcome reflects not so much a weakness in ASEAN as in Northeast Asia. If ERIA was to be an OECD for Asia, then it ought to be based in a Paris-equivalent city in Asia (i.e. the capitals of either China or Japan), which Jakarta (despite being very nice) simply is not. If, on the other hand, the goal of the ERIA was to boost Japan’s presence in southeast, this outcome makes more sense (Japan would likely lose political points for insisting the ERIA be based in Tokyo, better to pawn it out to ASEAN).

In fact, Japan’s influence on ERIA was clear from the outset. Firstly, Japan offered to fund the organization through its first ten years to the tune of 10 billion yen over ten years. Secondly, ERIA was established with institutional links to the Japanese External Trade Research Organisation (JETRO). The Chairman of JETRO Watanabe Osamu has carefully played down any Japanese influence within ERIA, even as it negotiated with ASEAN members were to establish the secretariat.

Unsurprisingly, the ERIA came to support the METI’s and JETRO’s position on the merits of the 16 party Free Trade Area, (known in Japan as Comprehensive Economic Partnership East Asia, CEPEA). No surprise either that Australia, New Zealand and India have stepped forward to pitch additional monies and more importantly legitimacy to the organization – often visibly and vocally supporting ERIA as something of a hat tip to Japan. These countries would be the major beneficiary of such a trade area, and perhaps just as crucially, are keen to shed their status as “odd men” and gain acceptance as a true regional member – something Japan just might be able to provide.

P.S. One of the effects of ERIA foundation was to put pressure of the NEAT process. In fact, the NEAT itself was hardly a success. NEAT is not an international institution of the same level as the ERIA, it does not possess its own headquarters, research staff or budget and is more or less an alliance of academics with good political connections. Indeed, the 2007 report entitled “Future Direction of NEAT” prepared by Thailand notes, “NEAT activities do not governmental support and are now facing possible competition from other newly established mechanisms like Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).” Additionally, the Japanese CEAC seems to have taken over running the NEAT, and the whole agenda there is shifting. It seems likely therefore that ERIA will win out as the lead research body in East Asian regionalism.